

GA First/II/1

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION:	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition
	of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
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SUBMITTED TO: The General Assembly First Committee

The General Assembly First Committee,

Approving of the success of the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC), leading to a destruction of 99.49% of all declared Category 1 weapons between the entry into force of the CWC and 2022,

Noting with pride the previous success of the OPCW for their work in successfully hosting "nine
 training courses on the analysis of Convention-related chemicals and on OPCW proficiency testing" in
 2022 as reported in the OPCW's annual report,

Concerned by the persistent barriers to effective Chemical Weapon Agent (CWA) testing such
 as limited reference data, lack of information sharing and limited coordination as noted by the United
 States Government Accountability Office in their September 2023 Report on the Status of Forensic Tech nologies and Challenges,

11 Deeply disturbed by the suffering caused by the misidentification or failure to identify in a timely 12 manner CWAs in the responses to the 1995 Tokyo Sarin attacks, the 2018 United Kingdom Salisbury nerve 13 agent attack and attacks in the Middle Eastern Region between 2010 and 2018, which underscore the 14 critical need for effective verification and rapid response capabilities,

Noting the vital need for first responders to be able to safely, accurately and quickly identify Chemical Weapon Agents (CWAs),

17 *Concerned that* currently deployed detection technology is often ineffectual at processing chem-18 ical samples that are small, dilute or degraded,

Acknowledging the benefit of new detection and verification methods that do not need direct samples to come to conclusive results regarding the use of chemical weapons, thereby enhancing the safety of OPCW personnel and facilitating verification in inaccessible or hazardous regions,

Recognizing the role of Member States in supporting the OPCW through shared information, expertise, transparency, cooperation, coordination and resources,

Noting the pressing need for the OPCW to enhance assistance and training programs for States,
 particularly those facing threats or impacts of chemical weapons by providing training, resources and
 support during emergencies regarding chemical weapons,

Viewing with appreciation the annual financial contributions of Member States to the OPCW as required under paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the CWC,

Requests the Secretary General establish of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) tasked
 with researching and identifying innovative techniques and technologies to enhance the chemical
 detection and verification process, while also:

(a) Working closely with the OPCW and other relevant organizations worldwide to ensure
 coordination and cooperation;

(b) Evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of new technologies, techniques and other regulations regarding chemical weapon verification;

- (c) Creating new training programs for OPCW agents, national leaders, community lead ers, medical professionals and anyone else who could use these training programs to protect their
 communities from chemical weapons;
- (d) Enhancing coordination between member states, non-governmental organizations
 and other research organizations to avoid duplication of results;
- 2. *Emphasizes* the importance of training first responders and OPCW personnel in new verification methods, including but not limited to:
- 43 (a) Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA-M22);
- 44 (b) Improved Chemical Agent Point Detection System (IPDS);
- 45 (c) Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD);
- 46 (d) Joint CB Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM);
- 47 (e) Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD);
- 3. *Supports* an expansion of the OPCW's Sampling and Analysis Training Program to prepare field experts to deploy these new verification methods;
- 4. *Requests* the OPCW to create a rapid response system in order to facilitate the operations of the OPCW, most especially timely support from the Technical Secretariat in assisting first response efforts, which would include:
- 53 (a) The creation of OPCW offices housing field experts in the following locations;
- 54 (i) Nairobi, Kenya, in the African region;
- 55 (ii) Bangkok, Thailand, in the Asia-pacific region;
- 56 (iii) Partner offices in Baghdad, Iraq and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in the Middle east-57 ern region;
- 58 (iv) Ankara, Trkiye, in the Eurasian region;
- 59 (v) Vienna, Austria, in the Eastern European region;
- 60 (vi) New York, United States of America, in the North American region;
- 61 (vii) Rio, Brazil, in the South American region;
- 62 (viii) The Hague, Netherlands, in the Western European Region and other states;
- 63 (b) Forming groups of experts maintained by the OPCW to be deployed on short notice 64 from any of the offices above to conduct verification of credible reports of chemical weapon usage;
- (c) Working and creating relationships with local organizations within the aforementioned regions to coordinate responses and share pertinent information;
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(d) Expanding the scope and quantity of training, education and outreach programs;

5. *Encourages* Member States to enhance transparency by voluntarily sharing information on national implementation methods and any developed practices in chemical weapon prohibition.

Passed, Yes: 65 / No: 4 / Abstain: 7